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HOW TAX COMPETITION MAY BE 





Tax and criminological research often converge on mutual 
socioeconomic observations, such as the demographic makeup of a given 
jurisdiction, its income distribution, educational attainment, rate of 
unemployment, or levels of poverty. This heightened attention to social 
predictors of revenue and crime is a recent development that started with the 
urbanization trend of the last one hundred years. In fact, social 
interdependence and awareness has become drastically more prominent this 
past century with the exponential growth of urbanization. While only 40% of 
the American population lived in urban areas at the turn of the 19th century, 
that percentage nearly doubled to 79% by the turn of the 20th century and is 
predicted to grow to almost 90% by 2050.2  
The urbanization trend has increased the density of social networks, 
including the intertwining of behavioral and policy phenomena that before 
the 19th century were thought to be independent of each other. For example, 
early criminological research viewed crime as the expression of something 
wrong with the individual committing the crime, such as sub-standard 
intelligence, psychic forces, biological imperfections, or “criminal bumps” 
 
1 Fabio Ambrosio, J.D., LL.M., M.B.A., C.P.A./P.F.S./A.B.V., C.F.P., E.A., 
C.V.A., M.A.F.F., C.F.E., C.G.M.A, is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at 
Central Washington University. Besides being an attorney and CPA, he is also a 
trained mediator and a recipient of a Fulbright grant in taxation. Fabio is a recurring 
visiting professor at Swiss and Chinese universities and serves as adjunct 
disciplinary counsel for the Washington State Bar Association. He is the author of 
the book Principles of Taxation in the United States: Theory, Policy, and Practice, 
and has published articles in the Journal of Tax Practice and Procedure, The Tax 
Development Journal, The CPA Journal, The Journal of Financial Planning, and The 
Value Examiner. Prior to joining academia, Fabio was an Appeals Officer in the 
estate and gift tax program at the Internal Revenue Service. 
2 Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Urbanization, OUR WORLD IN DATA, (Sept. 
2018), https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization#citation.  
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on the head.3 Only in more recent times the research focus has shifted to 
society as the possible explanation for criminal behavior. 
Crime is but one of the phenomena that was previously thought to 
depend solely on the individual and was recently rediscovered as fitting in a 
greater social science. Urbanization has also changed the way researchers 
study law, economics, epidemiology, ecology, anthropology, and many other 
disciplines embedded in the relationship between people and their ecosystem. 
For example, the urbanization phenomenon has deeply impacted the United 
States geopolitically and fiscally. From a tax perspective, the jurisdictional 
overlap and tangency of the American federal system, coupled with the 
urbanization trend, has created unique layers of vertical and horizontal tax 
competition.4 There is horizontal tax competition where two jurisdictions 
vertically equivalent, such as two counties, compete for the same revenue. 
There is vertical tax competition where two jurisdictions not vertically 
equivalent, such as the state and a county within the state, compete for the 
apportionment of tax revenue.5 
Competition can be viewed as the intersect between tax and 
criminological research. Whether the context is tax or crime, competition 
refers to the same concept: the unequitable partition of a finite amount of 
resources. In both bodies of literature, this unequitable distribution, often 
associated with an obsessive culture of success and pursuit of the American 
dream, leads to the disorganization of social structure, the disruption of 
family values, and the stratification of social classes based on wealth. 
Criminological literature has repeatedly explained crime through measures 
 
3 AUGUST AICHHORN, Verwahrloster Jugend Wien: Internationaler 
Psychoanalytischer Verlag [WAYWARD YOUTH OF VIENNA] (1925); ROBERT L. 
DUGDALE, THE JUKES: A STUDY IN CRIME, PAUPERISM, AND HEREDITY, (G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1877); HENRY H. GODDARD, FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS: ITS CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES (MacMillan Co., 1914); GINA LOMBROSO, CRIMINAL MAN, 
ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF CESARE LOMBROSO, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1911). 
4 Michael Devereux et al., Horizontal and Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: 
Theory and Some Evidence From the USA, 91 J. OF PUB. ECON. 451 (2007). 
5 Cynthia L. Rogers, Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) Policy on the Urban 
Fringe, 34 J. REG’L ANALYSIS & POL’Y 27 (2004); John D. Wong, The Impact of 
Local Option Sales Taxes on Retail Sales, Employment, Payrolls, and 
Establishments: The Case for Kansas, 26 REV. REG’L STUD. 165 (1996); Zhirong 
Zhao, Motivations, Obstacles, and Resources: The Adoption of the General-
Purpose Local Option Sales Tax in Georgia Counties, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 721 
(2005). 
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of inequality in income, wealth distribution, educational attainment, 
unemployment, and opportunities. By exacerbating inequalities across 
jurisdictions, tax competition may be laying the foundations for more crime. 
I. CRIMINOLOGICAL LITERATURE 
There is an ample body of empirical criminological research from 
the last century that has looked at the statistical relationship between crime 
and variables predicting crime. The early trend at the turn of the 19th century 
was to explain crime through factors wholly within the individual.6 The 
urbanization trend at the turn of the century caused a major change in 
criminological research, shifting the focus of crime predictors toward social 
indicators of crime outside the control of the individual. Unlike the early 
research, modern studies formulate numerous theories of crime predictions, 
which, albeit different, are all embedded in the greater social context. 
One of the first researchers to formulate a socially induced crime 
theory was Robert Merton, often seen as the father of social anomie theory.7 
In general terms, the theory of social anomie suggests that an excessively 
competitive society may lead to the disintegration of ethical behavior due to 
the struggle for survival of the fittest. Merton argued that the rigid conformity 
with traditional American values of economic success created a fictitious 
picture where everyone, through hard work, could achieve the American 
dream.8 This cultural indoctrination of obsessive economic success 
inevitably emarginated those not able to achieve the American dream through 
legitimate means. Therefore, Merton argued, it was the exaltation of 
“success-seeking” that explained crime.9 In the theory of social anomie, 
“anomie” is the result of the weakening of ethical behavior as society places 
the largest emphasis on whether success is achieved, more so than how. 
Social anomie theory rests on the premise that something is fundamentally 
broken in the social structure, or its priorities, which fosters deviant 
behavior.10 In this respect, social anomie theory also implies that economic 
 
6 AICHHORN, supra note 3; DUGDALE, supra note 3; GODDARD, supra note 3; 
LOMBROSO, supra note 3. 
7 Robert Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOCIO. REV. 672 (1938). 
8 Merton, supra note 7. 
9 Id.  
10 Mitchell B. Chamlin & John K. Cochran, Assessing Messner and 
Rosenfeld's Institutional Anomie Theory: A Partial Test, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 411 
(1995); Merton, supra note 7; Jukka Savolainen, Inequality, Welfare State, and 
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safety nets may mitigate the incidence of some types of crime, as they reduce 
social stress.11  
Before moving on to other emerging criminological theories, the 
meta-analysis of one hundred years of criminological research offers 
valuable insights into how social trends shaped the research approach. The 
early individualistic studies of Dugdale, Goddard, and others were followed 
by a more complex and urbanized world, which increased awareness of 
intricate social dynamics potentially leading to crime. The theory of social 
anomie picked up on these dynamics during five decades of immense social 
strain caused by two world wars and the Great Depression. These were major 
events that, at least with respect to criminological literature, promoted a more 
liberal and collective agenda.12 Not surprisingly, social anomie theory came 
under attack in the 1970’s, when the American dream and economic success 
were once again at the forefront of self-identification and anomie theory was 
viewed as promoting a social agenda.13 In the last 50 years, two new theories 
have emerged—social disorganization theory and deprivation theory—that 
continue to find crime predictors in the greater social context but do not call 
into question the very essence of American culture: economic success and 
the American dream.  
The theory of social disorganization rests on the statistical 
relationship between crime and social disorder indicators, such as increased 
urbanization, longer commute time, higher population density, and sparse 
friendship networks.14 Shaw and McKay first formulated the theory when 
 
Homicide: Further Support for the Institutional Anomie Theory, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 
1021 (2000). 
11 James DeFronzo, Economic Assistance to Impoverished Americans: 
Relationship to Incidence of Crime, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 119 (1983).   
12 Travis C. Pratt, Assessing the Relative Effects of Macro-level Predictors of 
Crime: A Meta-Analysis, (Jan. 19, 2001) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Cincinnati) (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing). 
13 STEVEN F. MESSNER & RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997). 
14 Paul E. Bellair, Social Interaction and Community Crime: Examining the 
Importance of Neighbor Networks, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1977); Robert J. Bursik 
Jr., Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and 
Prospects, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 519 (1988); Robert Sampson & Byron W. Groves, 
Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. 
SOCIO. 774 (1989); CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (University of Chicago Press 1972); Ralph B. 
Taylor, Social Order and Disorder of Street Blocks and Neighborhoods: Ecology, 
Microecology, and the Systemic model of Social Disorganization, 35 J. RSCH. IN 
CRIME & DELINQ 113 (1997). 
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they studied juvenile crime across Chicago neighborhoods and found that 
crime was more prevalent in certain neighborhoods.15 They found that these 
neighborhoods were “socially disorganized” in the sense that they had weak 
social institutions—churches, schools, and adolescence organizations—
unable to adequately supervise the youth.16 Research in traditional social 
disorganization theory looks at residential mobility, racial heterogeneity, 
strengths of social associations and networks, and socioeconomic status: all 
indicators at the neighborhood level. A more focused and recent approach to 
the theory of social disorganization has noted that traditional social 
disorganization theory has failed to consider the structure of the family as 
predictive of that of the neighborhood.17 In this respect, measures of family 
disruption such as divorce, single parenthood, the strength of the family 
network, and time invested in raising children offer additional indicators of 
social disruption at the micro family level.18  
Deprivation theory suggests that crime is linked to indicators of 
economic deprivation, where the general lack of means leads to higher 
crime.19 For example, multiple studies have found a significant positive 
relationship between unemployment rates and property crime, or poverty and 
crime at large.20 Under the theory of deprivation, the business and economic 
cycles are useful predictors of crime.21 The theory of deprivation, however, 
does not only take an absolute form—whether poverty or unemployment is 
present—but also a relative form. In its relative form, deprivation theory 
 
15 SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 14. 
16 Id. 
17 ROBERT J. SAMPSON, Neighborhood Family Structure and the Risk of 
Personal Victimization, in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME 25 (Springer, 1986). 
18 SAMPSON, supra note 17; Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social 
Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOCIO. REV. 
588 (1979); Nigel Barber, Single Parenthood as a Predictor of Cross-National 
Variation in Violent Crime, 38 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 343 (2004). 
19 J. ROBERT LILLY et al., CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: CONTEXT AND 
CONSEQUENCES (Sage Publications, Inc. 2d ed., 1995); AUSTIN T. TURK, 
CRIMINALITY AND THE LEGAL ORDER (Rand McNally, 1969). 
20 Marvin D. Krohn, Inequality, Unemployment and Crime: A Cross-National 
Analysis, 17 SOCIO. Q. 303 (1976); E. Britt Patterson, Poverty, Income Inequality, 
and Community Crime Rates, 29 CRIMINOLOGY, 755 (1991); Ruth D. Peterson & 
William C. Bailey, Forcible Rape, Poverty, and Economic Inequality in U.S. 
Metropolitan Communities, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1988); Steven 
Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on 
Crime, 44 J. L. &. ECON. 259 (2001).  
21 Albert C. Wagner, Crime and Economic Change in Philadelphia, 27 J. 
CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1936). 
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looks at inequality and wealth distribution rather than poverty or 
unemployment.22 Relative deprivation research has found that economic 
inequality is positively associated with crime, thus suggesting that income 
redistribution may be a more effective measure of crime intervention than 
punishment.23 Deprivation theory can be viewed as a growth form of social 
anomie theory in that both study the social stress between those who have 
and those who do not as predictors of crime. Unlike social anomie theory, 
deprivation theory does not blame a broken success-hungry society, but 
merely suggests that the satisfaction of basic needs and avoidance of 
excessive social stratification of classes may be sufficient to curb criminal 
behavior without redesigning the very essence of the American culture driven 
by seeking economic success.  
Theories of crime prediction are naturally interwoven. For example, 
an increased divorce rate, coupled with both parents being fully employed, 
would suggest lower 
property crime rates as 
deprivation decreases, but 
higher non-property crime 
rates because of family 
disruption and social 
disorganization. 24 None of 
the theories claim to offer 
infallible forecasts but a 
meta-analysis of all 
criminological research 
shapes four key paradigms 
of the strongest and most 
stable predictors of crime: 
 
22 Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan 
Structure and Violent Crime. 47 AM. SOCIO. REV. 114 (1982). 
23 Leo Carroll & Pamela I. Jackson, Inequality, Opportunity, and Crime Rates 
in Central Cities. 21 CRIMINOLOGY 178 (1983); Sheldon Danziger & David 
Wheeler, The Economics of Crime: Punishment or Income Redistribution, 33 REV. 
SOC. ECON. 113, (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973); Lynne M. 
Vieraitis, Inequality and Urban Crime: Labor Stratification, Income Inequality, 
Poverty, and Violent Crime in Large United States Cities, 1990. (Oct. 4, 1999) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing). 
24 Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness 
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1. Indicators of social disorganization (SD); 
2. Indicators of family disruption (FD); 
3. Indicators of absolute or relative deprivation (ARD);  
4. Demographics (DG). 25 
Criminological literature offers three further lessons that are 
important. First, policing and arrest measures are among the weakest 
indicators of crime as they predict the use of public resources in fighting 
crime but not the crime itself.26 Therefore, data pertaining to the size of the 
police force per capita or the number of arrests is not useful to a study that 
aims to gauge future crime trends.  
Second, the value of the indicators of crime is in its degree of change 
over time. For example, a 1993 study looked at whether an abrupt change in 
a crime indicator is itself a crime predictor.27 The study looked at 500 
delinquents and 500 control subjects matched by age, IQ, and 
neighborhood.28 The study then gathered exhaustive records on the subjects’ 
life course and identified several life-turning points on a common scale.29 
The study found that adult crime is clearly connected to childhood behavior, 
but perhaps more so because it could lead to weaker adult social bonds (e.g., 
labor force attachment and marital cohesion), which are mitigative of crime.30 
Thus, the benefits of a longitudinal study are evident in its ability to, among 
other things, capture the predictive value of change.  
Third, crime is often spatially autocorrelated and this autocorrelation 
principle, coupled with longitudinal data and spatial association, dramatically 
improves the predictable power of a statistical model.31 This is, in fact, the 
 
25 Amy E. Nivette, Cross-National Predictors of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 15 
HOMICIDE STUD. 103 (2011); Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing 
Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & 
JUST. 373 (2005). 
26 Pratt & Cullen, supra note 25. 
27 John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Turning Points in the Life Course: Why 
Change Matters to the Study of Crime, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 301 (1993).  
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 305. 
30 Id. at 306. 
31 THE HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (Beth M. Huebner ed. & Timothy S. Bynum ed., Wiley) (2016); NED 
LEVINE, Spatial Autocorrelation Statistics, in CRIMESTAT IV: A SPATIAL 
STATISTICS PROGRAM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CRIME INCIDENT LOCATIONS, 
VERSION 4.0, NAT. INST. JUST. (2013). 
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very principle behind the crime prediction CrimeStat software, developed 
under the direction of the United States Department of Justice.32 
II. TAX LITERATURE 
A 1989 study found that the package of public services provided by 
local governments is relatively standardized across localities; however, the 
way local governments finance those public services is quite diverse.33 After 
all, most cities must offer the same set of housekeeping functions: what will 
vary is the quality of the services and thus the tax price. When it comes to 
financing local public services, many studies have examined the optimal 
revenue portfolio composition for local governments.34  
Historically, the property tax has been the most important source of 
local government revenue in the United States. Since the Reagan 
administration, public support for the property tax has dramatically 
decreased. While in 1970 property taxes contributed 84% of all local 
government tax collections, the property tax share fell to 32% by 1994 and 
down to 26.6% by 2015.35 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the 
“property tax revolt.” The property tax revolt forced local governments to 
provide social services without relying too heavily on property taxes, as they 
once did. In the last five decades, local governments have struggled to make 
up for the lost property tax revenue through other revenue sources, such as 
fines, licensing fees, utility taxes, documentary fees, bonds, and sales taxes.36  
 
32 CrimeStat: Spatial Statistics Program for the Analysis of Crime Incident 
Locations. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (2011), 
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/crimestat-spatial-statistics-program-analysis-
crime-incident-locations.  
33 Mark Schneider, Fragmentation and the Growth of Local Government, 48 
PUB. CHOICE. 255, 264 (1989).  
34 David S. Jones & Maureen M. McIntosh, Revenue Options for Georgia 
Localities, 6 GA. GOV’T REV. 6, (1974); Ben Lockwood, Commodity Tax 
Competition and Tax Coordination under Destination and Origin Principles (Ctr. 
for Econ. Policy Research, Paper No. 2256, 2000); Zhirong Jerry Zhao & 
Changhoon Jung, Does Earmarked Revenue Provide Property Tax Relief? Long-
Term Budgetary Effects of Georgia’s Local Option Sales Tax, 28 PUB. BUDGETING 
& FIN. 52 (2008).  
35 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CRITICAL ISSUES IN STATE-
LOCAL FISCAL POLICY: A GUIDE TO LOCAL OPTION TAXES (Scott R. MacKey ed., 
1997); U.S. DEP’T COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/ 
(2015). 
36 INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF COUNTY AND 
CITY REVENUES (2013). 
2020] How Tax Competition May be Exacerbating Inequalities 231 
 
The sales tax has become increasingly popular after the property tax 
revolt for two main reasons. First, the sales tax has a low degree of salience,37 
which makes it politically more acceptable than the property or income tax.38 
Under the theory of tax salience, “salience” represents the degree of 
consumer response to a tax change for reasons other than the net tax liability, 
such as the way that taxes are displayed and the tax payment mechanism. 
Therefore, an invisible tax, such as a sales tax added at the register, has low 
salience and may not impact consumer behavior as much as expected based 
on the sales tax rate.39 Southern states, such as Tennessee, North Carolina, 
and Georgia, have spearheaded the effort to restructure local public financing 
relying less on property tax revenue and more on sales tax revenue. Nearly 
all the research concerning local sales tax policy to date, in fact, has been 
geographically specific to these states.40 
Second, the sales tax allows a jurisdiction to shift the cost incidence 
of critical social services to residents of neighboring jurisdictions and 
research has shown that taxpayers favor proposals that shift the tax incidence 
to someone else.41 This trend promotes horizontal tax competition.42 
Horizontal tax competition can be one of necessity, where residents of 
neighboring jurisdictions are forced to commute to shop or find work in 
another jurisdiction. It could also be a perfect competition where a 
jurisdiction allures business and shopping through lower sales tax rates. In 
both cases, the result is a tax spillover, a phenomenon where a jurisdiction 
 
37 Raj Chetty et. al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1145 (2009); Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Three Essays on Tax 
Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011).  
38 J. Biegelson & David Sjoquist, Rational Voting Applies to Choice of Taxes, 
57 PUB. CHOICE 39 (1988); Andrew D. Green, Life in the Fast Lane: 
Transportation Finance and the Local Option Sales Tax, 38 ST. LOC. GOV’T. REV. 
92 (2006). 
39 Chetty et al., supra note 37; Gamage, supra note 37.  
40 Anicca C. Jansen, Can Sales Tax Revenue Equitable Finance Education?, 
16 J. EDUC. FIN. 478 (1991); Jones, supra note 34; Ross Rubenstein & Catherine 
Freeman, Do Local Sales Taxes for Education Increase Inequities? The Case of 
Georgia’s ESPLOST, 28 J. EDUC. FIN. 425 (2003); Wen Wang & Zhirong Jerry 
Zhao, Fiscal Effects of Local Option Sales Tax on School Facilities Funding: 
Evidence from North Carolina, 23 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT., FIN., MGMT. 507 
(2011); Zhao & Jung, supra note 34; Zhirong Jerry Zhao, Motivations, Obstacles, 
and Resources: The Adoption Of the General-Purpose Local Option Sales Tax in 
Georgia Counties, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 721 (2005).  
41 Biegeleisen & Sjoquist., supra note 38.  
42 Gregory Burge & Brian Piper, Strategic Fiscal Interdependence: County 
and Municipal Adoptions of Local Option Sales Tax, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 387 (2012).  
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collects an amount of sales tax different from the product of the sales tax rate 
and the income spent by its residents.43 The overall result is an uneven flow 
of tax revenue due to the spatial mobility of the revenue base. Tax spillovers 
preclude an equity condition known as “fiscal equivalence.”44 Fiscal 
equivalence would be present if a body of taxpayers paying for a public 
service is 100% congruent with the body of taxpayers benefitting from that 
public service. Fiscal equivalence, tax spillovers, and mitigation mechanisms 
are key elements to the theory of tax competition.  
At the local government level, sales taxes often take the form of 
Local Option Sales Taxes (LOST).45 LOST consist of optional local increases 
to the statewide sales tax rate. The increase is optional because localities can 
choose whether to impose it and at what rate (within the rate limits authorized 
by a state). LOST are generally levied towards a local general fund, but can 
be levied to finance specific purposes, such as education or transportation, in 
which case they are commonly referred to as “Special Purpose” Local Option 
Sales Taxes (SPLOST). For example, Tennessee,46 North Carolina,47 and 
Georgia48 have tried to finance public schools through a special local sales 
tax surcharge imposed by the counties. Similarly, California tried to finance 
public roads.49 Generally, studies have found that SPLOST are a suboptimal 
method of financing critical government services because sales tax revenue 
flows unevenly: since the revenue base (economic spending) is mobile, sales 
tax revenue tends to flow where most shopping opportunities exist.50 While 
the uneven flow could be mitigated through revenue-sharing at the state level, 
state tax laws rarely mandate revenue sharing of local sales tax revenue. Not 
surprisingly, research has shown that SPLOST tied to education and 
 
43 Gregory Burge & Cynthia Rogers, Local option sales taxes and consumer 
spending patterns: Fiscal interdependence under multi-tiered local taxation, 41 
REGIONAL SCI. URB. ECON. 46 (2010).  
44 Jansen, supra note 40; Lockwood, supra note 34.  
45 Ronald J. Shadbegian, The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the 
Revenue Structure of Local Government, 1962-87, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 221 (1999); 
Zhao, supra note 40.  
46 TENN. CODE ANN. §67-6-701 (2020). 
47 N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-463 (2020).  
48 GA. CODE ANN. §48-8-111 (2020). 
49 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §132300 (2020). 
50 Burge & Rogers, supra note 43. 
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transportation exacerbate inequalities among counties to the detriment of 
rural communities.51  
Local option sales tax literature has examined the interjurisdictional 
tax competition whereby an increase in sales tax rates in one local jurisdiction 
causes consumers to spend more in neighboring lower tax jurisdictions.52 The 
results were confirmed by a 2010 study which found that LOST rates are 
inversely and significantly related to retail sales and that higher sales tax rates 
in rural communities accompany a disproportionally high erosion of retail 
sales.53 From these studies we learn that market dominant, densely populated 
jurisdictions surrounded by rural jurisdictions are best suited to export the tax 
cost of their social services. 
Most of the literature to date has focused on generic LOST policy 
without distinction as to what social services the imported LOST revenue is 
used to finance. In the context of SPLOST, the limited literature available 
has focused on the correlation between SPLOST and public education 
financing54 or public transportation financing.55 One of these studies 
examined the correlation between LOST rates and local public education 
financing in Tennessee.56The Tennessee study found that sales tax revenue 
and capacity was particularly low in rural counties, which were in turn unable 
to properly fund education.57 Another SPLOST study specific to public 
education in North Carolina confirmed that the adoption of an education 
SPLOST was aggravating inequalities across public schools within the state, 
recommending that the central state government adopt a sales tax revenue 
 
51 Green, supra note 38; Jansen supra note 40; Gary L. Peevely & John R. 
Ray, Equity As Determined By Locally Funded Teaching Positions in Tennessee 
Schools, 15 J. EDUC. FIN. 289 (1989); Rubenstein & Freeman, supra note 40; 
Catherine Sielke, Rural Factors in State Funding Systems, 29 J. EDUC. FIN. 223 
(2004).  
52 Cynthia L. Rogers, Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) Policy on the Urban 
Fringe, 34 J. REG’L ANALYSIS POL’Y. 27 (2004); John D. Wong, The Impact of 
Local Option Sales Taxes on Retail Sales, Employment, Payrolls, and 
Establishments: The Case for Kansas, 26 REV. REG’L STUD. 165 (1996); Zhao, 
supra note 40.  
53 Burge & Rogers, supra note 43.  
54 Peevely & Ray, supra note 51; Jansen, supra note 40; Rubenstein & 
Freeman, supra note 40; Sielke, supra note 51; Wen Wang & Zhirong Jerry Zhao, 
Fiscal Effects of Local Option Sales Tax on School Facilities Funding: Evidence 
from North Carolina, 23 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 507 (2011).  
55 Green, supra note 38. 
56 Jansen, supra note 40. 
57 Id.  
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sharing scheme across the state in order to mitigate tax spillovers.58 Every 
other study reached similar conclusions: funding local services through sales 
tax revenue exacerbates inequalities between urban communities with market 
dominance and rural communities without market dominance.59 
III. THE LOCAL OPTION SALES TAX LANDSCAPE IN WASHINGTON 
STATE 
The State of Washington has never levied an income tax and has 
therefore historically always been funded through property and sales taxes, 
thus severely altering the state’s portfolio flexibility. The tax system in the 
State of Washington is in fact the most regressive in the nation, as it relies 
most heavily on sales taxes.60 The State of Washington is also the first and 
only jurisdiction in the United States that ties one or more SPLOST not to 
education or transportation, but to public safety.  
Under RCW 82.14, the state offers counties and cities three optional 
sales tax surcharges earmarked for public safety.61 The first option permits 
any county to impose, without vote but subject to repeal by referendum, a 
0.1% SPLOST earmarked to fund criminal justice, broadly defined as 
“activities that substantially assist the criminal justice system, which may 
include circumstances where ancillary benefit to the civil justice system 
occurs, and which includes domestic violence services such as those 
provided by domestic violence programs, community advocates, and legal 
advocate….”62 Once collected, 10% of the tax remains in the county coffers 
and 90% is shared among the county and the cities within the county ratably 
based on population.  
The second option is more complicated as it offers a “county option” 
and a “city option.” The county option allows any county to impose, subject 
to a majority approval of county voters, up to a 0.3% SPLOST, one third of 
 
58 Wang & Zhao, supra note 54.  
59 Peevely & Ray, supra note 51; Rubenstein & Freeman, supra note 40; 
Sielke, supra note 51; Green, supra note 38.  
60 Real Change: Study: Washington Bottoms Out on US Tax Assessment, INST. 
ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (Oct. 24, 2018), https://itep.org/real-change-study-
washington-bottoms-out-on-us-tax-assessment/; William H. Gates, Sr., Tax 
Alternatives for Washington State, WASH. STATE DEP’T REV. (Nov. 2002), 
https://dor.wa.gov/about/statistics-reports/tax-structure-final-report.  
61 WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14 (2020). 
62 § 82.14.340.  
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which must be used to fund either criminal justice or fire protection.63 Once 
collected, 40% of the tax remains in the county coffers and 60% is shared 
among the county and the cities within the county ratably based on 
population. The city option allows any city, independently of counties, to 
impose, subject to a majority approval of county voters, a 0.1% SPLOST, 
one third of which must be used to fund criminal justice programs.64 Once 
collected, 85% of the tax remains in the city coffers and 15% is distributed 
to the county. 
The third option permits counties with populations of less than one 
million to impose, subject to a majority approval of county voters, a 0.1% 
SPLOST earmarked to fund “costs associated with financing, design, 
acquisition, construction, equipping, operating, maintaining, remodeling, 
repairing, reequipping, and improvement of juvenile detention facilities and 
jails.”65 Once collected, this tax remains entirely in the county coffers and is 
not shared with the cities within the county. 
State-issued literature typically refers to the three above-mentioned 
SPLOSTs as criminal justice (first option), public safety (second option), and 
juvenile facilities (third option) SPLOST.  
 
 
As of 2018, only Asotin, Garfield, Klickitat, and Wahkiakum 
counties have not adopted any of the three SPLOST options. Only Benton, 
Franklin, Kittitas, San Juan, Spokane, Walla Walla, and Whatcom counties 
 
63 § 82.14.450(1). 
64 § 82.14.450(2). 
65 § 82.14.350.  
Option 1 2 (County Option) 2 (City Option) 3
Authority RCW 82.14.340 RCW 82.14.450(1) RCW 82.14.450(2) RCW 82.14.350
Commonly Referred to as Criminal Justice SPLOST Public Safety SPLOST Public Safety SPLOST Juvenile Facilities SPLOST
Rate of Tax 0.10% 0.30% 0.10% 0.10%
Portion Earmarked for Criminal Programs 100.00% 33.33% 33.33% 100.00%
Authorized Jurisdictions All Counties, no vote, 
subject only to repeal by 
Counties with populations 
of <1M, subject to majority 
All Counties, subject to 
majority vote
All Cities, subject to 
majority vote





repairing, reequipping, and 
improvement of juvenile 
detention facilities and jails
Criminal justice (same as 
RCW 82.14.340) and/or fire 
protection.
Criminal justice (same as 
RCW 82.14.340) and/or fire 
protection.
Earmarked Funds may be used for Activities that substantially 
assist the criminal justice 
system, which may include 
circumstances where 
ancillary benefit to the civil 
justice system occurs, and 
which includes domestic 
violence services such as 
those provided by domestic 
violence programs, 
community advocates, and 
legal advocate
Revenue sharing? 10% county; 90% county and 
cities based on population
No60% county; 40% county and 
cities based on population
85% city; 15% county
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have adopted all three SPLOST options. All other counties have adopted one 
or two SPLOST options, but not all three. 
 
Source: Washington State Department of Revenue.66 
 
As informed by criminological and tax literature, the Washington 
SPLOST model is expected to exacerbate inequalities across Washington 
counties. If tax revenue is flowing unevenly across the State because of the 
urbanization trend and a portion of that tax revenue is earmarked for public 
safety, some counties are expected to be financially better able to guarantee 
public safety than others.  
This study tabulated data pertaining to all 39 Washington counties 
based on their market dominance and crime levels. For purposes of this study, 
counties that collected more than 1.25 times the state-wide average of sales 
tax per capita from 2014 to 2017 are labeled Market Dominant (MD). 
Counties are labeled High Need (HN) if they meet at least one of the 
following two criteria based on 2016 crime statistics: (a) a total crime rate 
equal to, or higher than, 1.25 times the state-wide average; or (b) a violent 
crime rate equal to, or higher than, 1.25 times the state-wide average. Maps 
showing which Washington counties are considered MD and HN based on 
the above criteria are below. 
 
66 Tax Rate Lookup, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 





















2020] How Tax Competition May be Exacerbating Inequalities 237 
 
 
Source: Washington State Department of Revenue.67 
 
 
Source: Washington Criminal Justice Databook.68 
 
 
67 Id.  
68 Washington State Criminal Justice Data Book, DATA.WA.GOV, 
https://data.wa.gov/Public-Safety/Criminal-Justice-Data-Book/ixek-wnci/data (last 
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As the sales tax revenue base is mobile, blue market dominant 
counties may stand a better chance to collect more SPLOST tax revenue, 
whereas red HN counties may have the highest need for that SPLOST tax 
revenue. Overlaying the two maps, there is reason to suspect that local sales 
tax revenue earmarked towards public safety is not flowing where it’s most 
needed, exacerbating inequalities between market dominant counties (King, 
Chelan, Douglas, Kittitas, and Columbia) and other counties. In fact, only 
two counties in the entire state (San Juan and Skagit) fit both HN and MD 
definitions.  
 
Source: Washington State Department of Revenue; Washington 
Criminal Justice Databook.69 
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